Oregon’s 76th Legislative Assembly convened on February 1, 2011. The Legislature has wasted no time introducing a multitude of new labor and employment bills, some with potentially far reaching effects. Below is a (non-exhaustive) list of some of the more interesting bills up for debate:
- HB 2035 -- Standardizes statute of limitations period for filing discrimination lawsuits. A person who has filed a BOLI complaint must file a lawsuit within one year of the occurrence of the unlawful practice or within 90 days of the mailing of BOLI’s 90-day notice, whichever is later.
- HB 2036 -- This bill was introduced at the request of the Commissioner of BOLI, and attempts to accomplish several significant changes. First, it proposes to lower the standard as to what’s considered a “substantial limitation in a major life activity,” and clarifies certain aspects of state statutes related to discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Second, it grants BOLI the authority to enforce provisions for employees to take crime victim leave to attend criminal proceedings. Third, it will allow employers to make decisions based on credit history of applicants for public safety officer employment.
- HB 2243 -- Allows Attorney General or BOLI to file suit related to discrimination against person for uniformed military service; includes $50,000 penalty for first violation, and $100,000 penalty for each subsequent violation.
- HB 2446 and HB 2771 seek to respectively amend and repeal ORS 659.70 and 659.785 related to workplace communication on employer opinions on religion and politics. While HB 2771 would seek to repeal those provisions entirely, HB 2446 seeks to amend the definitions and exceptions to those provisions and amend the damages as well.
- HB 2828 -- Would make it unlawful (including a civil penalty of $750) to cease to provide health, disability, life or other insurance during period employee serves on a jury.
- HB 2862 -- This bill would extend various anti-discrimination laws to persons working for educational purposes or as volunteers.
- HB 2095 -- Requires granting family leave under OFLA for academic activities of the employee’s child, including teacher conferences or meetings, and requires granting up to 18 hours of family leave for academic activities in a one-year period, but not more than six hour per calendar month.
- SB 506 -- Allows eligible employee to take family leave related to the death of a family member.
- HB 2850 -- Adds siblings as covered family members under OFLA.
Wage and Hour:
- HB 2038 -- Modifies expression of breast milk provisions. Requires employers to provide a reasonable rest period each time an employee has a need to express milk and eliminates the undue hardship exception for employees with 50 or more employees
- HB 2040 -- Requires unpaid wages requested by employee post-termination or discharge to be mailed by certified mail, return receipt request.
- HB 2230 -- Requires employers to offer first payment to a new employee within 14 days of employment, unless declined by employee. Carries a maximum fine of $720 for violations.
- HB 2861 -- Expands Oregon’s wage discrimination law to bar wage discrimination based on a more expansive list of protected classifications, not just sex.
- Immigration: HB 2802 and HB 2973 include a variety of immigration-related provisions, some of which would affect employers. One such provision includes a prohibition against knowingly employing unauthorized aliens, which includes a maximum six-month prison sentence and/or up to $2,500 fine. Another would require employers to verify immigration status of employees hired after January 1, 2012, and authorizes the Attorney General to investigate violations and suspend or revoke business licenses of violators.
- Health Care Employees: SB 199 -- Requires health care facilities/employers of 25 or more employees to provide mandatory annual vaccinations against influenza, varicella zoster, pertussis, Hepatitis B, measles, mumps and rubella at no cost to employees.
World of Employment will keep you updated regarding the status of these (and other) bills up for debate this legislative session, and will provide an end-of-session wrap-up of the winners and losers.
Supreme Court: Disparate Impact Plaintiffs Can Sue Based on the Application of the Discriminatory Practice
The Supreme Court today issued a judicial smackdown to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, unanimously reversing its decision in Lewis v. City of Chicago (as we suggested it should when we reviewed the details of this case back in October!). Briefly put, the plaintiffs are a group of approximately 6,000 black firefighter applicants who filed charges of race discrimination with the EEOC more than 300 days after the initial announcement of their application test results, but within 300 days of the hiring of the new firefighter class from which they allege they were denied consideration. The Seventh Circuit held that the “discrimination was complete when the tests were scored...and the applicants learned the results.”
Justice Scalia, writing for the entire Court, stated that because there is no dispute that the claim was filed within 300 days of the hiring of the new class, the issue in this case is not “whether a claim predicated on the [on the hiring of the new firefighter class] is timely, but whether the practice thus defined can be the basis for a disparate-impact claim at all.” (Emphasis in original.) In other words, while the parties agreed that the adoption of a practice had a disparate impact, the real question was whether a cause of action can arise from the application of that same practice. The Court held that it could. Citing its recent opinion in another firefighter test case—Ricci v. DeStefano, the court noted that “a plaintiff establishes a prima facie disparate-impact claim by showing that the employer ‘uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact’ on one of the prohibited bases.”
Per the Court, the City believes that this decision “will result in a host of practical problems for employers and employees alike,” in that it may subject employers to an increased number of disparate-impact lawsuits based on long-stranding practices. That may, in fact, be true. Following this decision, any employer engaging in a practice whose application may result in a disparate impact on some protected classification of employees should take the time to reevaluate that practice. While there may be a legitimate business defense for the practice (as remains to be seen in the Lewis case on remand), it’s going to be easier for employees to get their foot in the door and state a claim.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed yesterday to hear a challenge to a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in a case with similar factual overtones to the Ricci case decided earlier this year. Like Ricci, this case involves a firefighter qualification test that had a disparate impact on black applicants; unlike Ricci, at issue here is the statute of limitations on a Title VII claim.
In this case, Lewis v. City of Chicago, the plaintiffs are a group of approximately 6,000 black firefighter applicants who filed charges of race discrimination with the EEOC more than 300 days after the initial announcement of their test results, but within 300 days of the hiring of the new firefighter class from which they allege they were denied consideration. The trial court held that the hiring of each new firefighter was a new violation of Title VII, so the EEOC charges were timely filed. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the “discrimination was complete when the tests were scored...and the applicants learned the results.” At issue for the Supreme Court is whether the limitations period for a Title VII claim begins to run when an employer announces the results of a test that could violate Title VII’s disparate impact provision, or if the right to sue begins only once the employer has acted on that policy.
At face value, it seems that the trial court probably got this one right and the Supreme Court should reverse the Seventh Circuit. How can an employee know what the actual disparate impact will be until the employer’s hiring decisions are actually made? If, for example, the employer’s business needs ultimately dictate that it need hire nobody, there has been no harm done regardless of the results of the test. An actual harm needs to occur before the right to sue accrues. Notwithstanding that analysis, and given the current makeup of the court, however, it is unclear which way the Court will go on this one. The Stoel Rives World of Employment will let you know when a decision is reached and how that decision may impact your workplace.
The Senate voted 61-36 yesterday to pass the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which is intended to overturn a U.S. Supreme Court decision that limited the time frame for bringing pay discrimination claims. The bill now will have to be reconciled with the House's version of the bill (H.R. 11), approved on a 247-171 vote Jan. 9, before President Obama can sign it into law.
The bill is named after Lilly Ledbetter, a former supervisor at a Goodyear tire plant in Alabama, who discovered that she had been receiving less pay than her male counterparts who were doing the same work. She discovered this by an anonymous note after working for the company for nearly 20 years. Her subsequent lawsuit was fought all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. In May 2007, the Court ruled in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), that the time limits for filing a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission start to run when the employer makes a discriminatory decision about the employee's compensation, not each time the employee receives a paycheck affected by discrimination. Though she lost her lawsuit, Ms. Ledbetter became a champion for equal pay for women.
The bill would reverse the Ledbetter ruling by amending most federal anti-discrimination laws to provide that the charge-filing periods—300 days in most states and 180 days in the few states that do not have a fair employment agency—would be triggered whenever an employee is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or practice.