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Ryan Gibson

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Ryan Gibson brings to his litigation and employment law practice the insights he gained while working in Washington, D.C. on international public policy and nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, both at the U.S. Department of State, where he held a Secret security clearance, and at the non-profit Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A senior associate in Stoel Rives’ Labor & Employment Group, Ryan represents employers in litigation in state and federal courts and in administrative agency proceedings. He has experience involving all aspects of employment-related issues including discrimination, harassment, retaliation, family leave, wage and hour, non-competition agreements, and traditional labor law.

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Here’s something that should be at the top of your to do list on this Monday morning:  make sure your benefits and other employee policies are in compliance with new guidance from the IRS that becomes effective today relating to federal tax treatment of same-sex marriages under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. Windsor.  In Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), which had prohibited recognition of same-sex marriages under federal law. That decision has several implications for employers, including application of employee leave laws such as the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which we blogged about recently.

Since the Windsor ruling, federal agencies have been busy carrying out President Obama’s directive to update regulations and guidance accordingly.  On August 29, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17 and two sets of FAQs (here and here), advising how the IRS will treat same-sex marriages for federal tax purposes. (Windsor was, after all, a tax case, in which the issue was whether the IRS was allowed to disregard a same-sex marriage for federal estate tax purposes).  The guidance becomes effective today, September 16, 2013.

Under that new guidance, the IRS will apply the marriage laws of the state or country in which the marriage was celebrated (‘state of celebration”) to determine if the couple is validly married for federal tax purposes, including tax and other issues relating to employee benefits.  Under the new IRS guidance, any same-sex marriage validly entered into in any state or foreign country that allows same-sex marriage will be recognized by the IRS for income, estate, and other tax purposes, even if the couple does not live or work in a state that recognizes the marriage.  For example, if a same-sex couple is married in Washington (or Canada), which recognizes same-sex marriage, and then moves to Oregon, which currently does not, the couple will still be considered married for federal tax purposes.Continue Reading Employers Should Review Benefits Plans And Other Policies Affecting Employees In Same-Sex Marriages As New IRS Guidance Implementing U.S. Supreme Court’s Windsor Decision Becomes Effective Today, September 16, 2013

Just last week, in the case GameStop Corp., a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) administrative law judge applied recent Board precedent and ignored contrary cases from federal courts to find an employer’s arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it waived the right of employees to bring class or collective actions.  While the decision has yet to be approved by the NLRB itself (parties can appeal ALJ decisions to the NLRB), it illustrates the continuing tension in this area between the NLRB (which disfavors class action waivers in employee arbitration agreements) and the federal courts (which favor them). 

As we have reported, U.S. federal courts continue to hold that employees may enter into arbitration agreements in which they waive the right to file class or collective action claims.  The U.S. Supreme Court put its stamp of approval on such waivers in 2011 in the blockbuster case AT&T v. Concepcion, holding that the enforceability of arbitration agreements was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which preempted any state law purporting to regulate arbitration agreements, including arbitration agreements with class action waivers.  Building on a decades-long line of cases steadily increasing support for the concept of arbitration and similar alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) methods for resolving litigation, Concepcion also held decisively that arbitration agreements could include waivers by the parties of the right to bring lawsuits as class actions.  The U.S. Supreme Court has re-affirmed Concepcion in subsequent decisions.Continue Reading Chasm Continues To Widen, For Now, Between NLRB and Federal Courts On Enforceability Of Class Action Waivers In Employment Agreements

As we’ve blogged about before, the EEOC has become more aggressive over the past few years in scrutinizing employer use of criminal background and credit checks.  While federal anti-discrimination laws do not expressly prohibit employers from performing background checks or similar screening methods on employees or applicants, their use can be unlawful where the practice has a “disparate impact” on protected classes of employees under Title VII.  Recently, the EEOC has issued Guidance documents focusing on disparate impact cases involving criminal history and credit checks, all as part of its interest in “systemic” forms of discrimination.  In addition to issuing guidance limiting when and how employers can use criminal and credit history background checks in employment, the EEOC has been actively investigating specific employers, as some readers of this blog are undoubtedly all too aware.  In some cases, the EEOC has even initiated lawsuits challenging employers’ use of background checks.  For example, the EEOC has filed suit just a few weeks ago against Dollar General (EEOC v. Dollar General, No. 1:13-cv-04307, Illinois) and BMW (EEOC v. BMW Manufacturing Co., LLC, No. 7:13-cv-01583-HMH-JDA, South Carolina).

Many employers and employment attorneys who have argued that appropriate use of background checks can be important and necessary believe the EEOC is going too far.  Those employers have complained that the EEOC’s aggressive position presumes the use of criminal or credit background checks is per se unlawful and amounts to a de facto ban on their use under any circumstances, regardless of whether or not they result in an unlawful disparate impact.  If you are one of those raising such concerns, federal judges may be listening.  A few weeks ago, a federal  judge in the U.S. District Court in Maryland issued an opinion granting summary judgment dismissal in another of the EEOC’s enforcement lawsuits, EEOC v. Freeman (No. 1:10-cv-2882, Maryland).  The scathing opinion by U. S. District Court Judge Roger Titus held that the EEOC’s evidence was unreliable and failed to raise a question of fact or show Freeman’s background check policies created a disparate impact in violation of Title VII.Continue Reading Maryland Federal District Court’s Dismissal of EEOC v. Freeman Provides Guidance for Employers on Background Check Rules

As almost everyone knows, the U.S. Supreme Court  issued two blockbuster decisions on gay marriage, U.S. v. Windsor, which struck down the Defense of Marriage Act’s ("DOMA") definition of marriage for the purposes of federal law, and Hollingsworth v. Perry, which struck down California’s "Proposition 8" prohibiting same-sex marriage in that state.  Those decisions will likely have significant effects on employers, such as with respect to employee benefits, health care and tax issues related to employees with same-sex partners.  For example,read here for a detailed discussion of how the Supreme Court’s decisions may impact employee benefits.

Those decisions, particularly Windsor, also will have an immediate impact on employee coverage under the federal Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), which requires covered employers to provide up to 12 weeks per year of unpaid leave to eligible employees for qualifying reasons (more leave may be required in certain situations, such as leave related to military duty).  One such qualifying reason entitles an employee to take leave to care for a family member, such as a family member with a serious health condition.  FMLA specifically defines family members to include a "spouse," which is further defined to mean a "husband or wife as defined or recognized under State law for purposes of marriage in the State where the employee resides, including common law marriage in States where it is recognized."  29 CFR 825.122.  Despite the fact that states have begun recognizing same-sex marriage in recent years, because the DOMA specifically defined marriage as only between a man and woman for the purposes of federal law, the DOMA basically overrode those states’ laws for the purposes of FMLA coverage to spouses.Continue Reading U.S. Supreme Court’s Decisions on DOMA Extend FMLA Definition of “Spouse” To Same-Sex Partners In States Recognizing Gay Marriage

Last week the Oregon Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Kemp v. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., holding that the plaintiff’s common law wrongful discharge claim was not precluded by the statutory remedies then available under Oregon or federal anti-discrimination laws, and that claim could properly be decided by a jury.  The case is another wrinkle in the ever-evolving and complex body of case law trying to define the contours of claims for common law wrongful discharge in Oregon.

Oregon Wrongful Discharge 101: A Quick Primer On When Common Law Wrongful Discharge Claims Can Be Precluded By Statutory Remedies

A claim for wrongful discharge is a common law tort claim developed by Oregon courts.  Many states’ courts have recognized the tort; Oregon’s Supreme Court first did so in the 1970s in Nees v. Hocks.  The specifics about what makes a discharge from employment “wrongful” and therefore tortious hinges on whether the employee’s termination violates an important public policy, usually where an employee is fulfilling an important job-related right or public duty.  As we have blogged about previously, courts have had difficulty wrestling with defining “wrongfulness” in specific cases, and divergent results can make it difficult to clearly understand which public duties and job-related rights are covered by the tort.  For example, being discharged for complaining about the employer’s fire code and safety violations (Love v. Polk County Fire Distr.) has been found wrongful, but a car salesman being fired for complaining about the employer’s allegedly deceptive sales tactics (Lamson v. Crater Lake Motors) or private security guards being fired for restraining or arresting concert-goers suspected of drug use and violent behavior (Babick v. Oregon Arena Corporation) was not.  Further, some courts have held wrongful discharge usually covers only conduct-based discrimination (taking action against an employee because of what they do, commonly known as “retaliation”), not status-based discrimination (based on a protected personal characteristic such as race, gender, or age), although this distinction is often inconsistently applied.Continue Reading Oregon Court of Appeals Continues Debate About Status of Wrongful Discharge Claims In Oregon in Kemp v. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc.

On one day recently, the U.S. Supreme Court issued employer-friendly opinions in two separate and long-awaited cases interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (known simply as “Title VII”), the primary federal employment discrimination statute.  While both cases change little about what employers should be doing day-to-day to prevent unlawful discrimination in the workplace, both may have profound effects on the ability of employers to successfully defend against Title VII claims.  In fact, this was such a big day at the Supreme Court for labor and employment law that we’re going to blog about it twice!  Today, we blog about one of those cases, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, in which the Court increased the burden of plaintiff’s asserting retaliation claims under Title VII by requiring that they show their protected conduct was the “but for” cause of the adverse employment action.  

Later in the week, we’ll blog about the other case, Vance v. Ball State University, in which the Court narrowed the definition of “supervisor” to only those with actual authority to hire and fire employees, limiting the situations where employers can be liable for the discriminatory acts of lower-level employees. 

Nassar Requires “But For” Causation In Title VII Retaliation Cases Based On That Statute’s Structure

Title VII, as any reader of this blog probably knows, is the granddaddy of all federal anti-discrimination statutes. First enacted in 1964, its primary provision, 42 USC § 2000e-2, prohibits employers from taking employment action against employees “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to, among other things, lessen the burden of proof on causation; plaintiffs bringing discrimination claims under Title VII need only show that a discriminatory motive was “a motivating factor…even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 USC § 2000e-2(m).  In other words, plaintiffs need not show that a discriminatory animus on the part of a manager was the only or even primary motive behind the employment action—if the employee’s race, gender, etc. was considered at all, the company could be liable for discrimination.  (Section 2(m) did create affirmative defenses that allow the employer to avoid money damages in these so called “mixed motive” cases if it can show that it would have taken the adverse action anyway regardless of the discriminatory motivation).

Continue Reading Part 1 of 2: The U.S. Supreme Court Issues Two Employer-Friendly Opinions On Title VII In Vance v. Ball State Univ. and Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar

As described by my colleague Howard Bye-Torre in his client advisory published earlier today, Mark Mazur, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy at the Treasury Department announced in a Tuesday blog post that the effective date for imposing employer pay-or-play penalties (also known “shared responsibility payments”) will be delayed by the IRS until 2015.

The IRS is expected to…

Coming as no big surprise since other states, like Utah and California, have been passing similar laws, the President of the Oregon Senate recently signed the final version of HB 2654, which will prohibit Oregon employers from compelling employees or applicants to provide access to personal social media accounts, like FaceBook or Twitter.  The law will also keep off limit to employers other sites that allow users to create, share or view user-generated content (like videos, still photos, blogs, videos, podcasts or instant messaging, email or website profiles), and also prohibits requiring that employees allow the boss to join or "friend" them on social media sites.  It also prohibits retaliation against any employee or applicant who refuses to provide access to accounts or to add the employer to his or her contacts list. The law becomes effective in January 2014.

Specifically, under the new law Oregon employers will not be allowed to:

  • Require or ask an employee or applicant to share a username or password allowing access to a personal social media account;
  • Require employees or applicants to add their employers to their contacts or friends lists;
  • Compel employees or applicants to access the accounts themselves to allow the employer to view the contents of a personal social media account;
  • Take or threaten to take any action to discharge, discipline or otherwise penalize an employee who refuses to share their account access information, allow their employer to view content, or add the employer to their contact or friends list (or fail or refuse to hire an applicant for the same things).

Continue Reading Oregon Legislature Passes HB 2654 Prohibiting Employers From Requiring Access To Employee Social Media Accounts

Today the US Supreme Court issued its long-awaited opinion in Genesis Healthcare v. Symczk. In the case, the Court held that employers could effectively end collective action lawsuits under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by agreeing to pay the named plaintiffs in those lawsuits whatever they claim they are owed. The Court held that because the named plaintiff was made completely whole by the employer’s offer her individual claim was moot, and because the named plaintiff’s claim was moot the entire collective action litigation was dismissed. This decision provides a helpful tactical weapon for employers that face the prospect of long and expensive collective action litigation.

How To “Pick Off” A Big FLSA Collective Action Lawsuit
Laura Symczk was employed as a nurse for Genesis, and was non-exempt under wage laws like the FLSA. She filed an FLSA “collective action” against Genesis claiming that it unlawfully failed to pay her and other nurses for meal breaks in which she had to work (the FLSA requires that employers pay employees for all their work time, including during meal breaks when the employee is not relieved of all work duties). Very early in the litigation, Genesis Healthcare issued what is called an “offer of judgment” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 68, offering to pay Symczk everything she claimed she was owed for her own unpaid work time (about $7,500, plus her attorney fees to date). The trial court then dismissed her entire collective action lawsuit, finding that because Symczk was made completely whole by Genesis’ offer and no others had yet joined the collective action, the case was “moot.”Continue Reading US Supreme Court Gives Green Light For Employers To Use Offers Of Judgment To Moot FLSA Collective Actions