As we’ve blogged about before, the EEOC has become more aggressive over the past few years in scrutinizing employer use of criminal background and credit checks.  While federal anti-discrimination laws do not expressly prohibit employers from performing background checks or similar screening methods on employees or applicants, their use can be unlawful where the practice has a “disparate impact” on protected classes of employees under Title VII.  Recently, the EEOC has issued Guidance documents focusing on disparate impact cases involving criminal history and credit checks, all as part of its interest in “systemic” forms of discrimination.  In addition to issuing guidance limiting when and how employers can use criminal and credit history background checks in employment, the EEOC has been actively investigating specific employers, as some readers of this blog are undoubtedly all too aware.  In some cases, the EEOC has even initiated lawsuits challenging employers’ use of background checks.  For example, the EEOC has filed suit just a few weeks ago against Dollar General (EEOC v. Dollar General, No. 1:13-cv-04307, Illinois) and BMW (EEOC v. BMW Manufacturing Co., LLC, No. 7:13-cv-01583-HMH-JDA, South Carolina).

Many employers and employment attorneys who have argued that appropriate use of background checks can be important and necessary believe the EEOC is going too far.  Those employers have complained that the EEOC’s aggressive position presumes the use of criminal or credit background checks is per se unlawful and amounts to a de facto ban on their use under any circumstances, regardless of whether or not they result in an unlawful disparate impact.  If you are one of those raising such concerns, federal judges may be listening.  A few weeks ago, a federal  judge in the U.S. District Court in Maryland issued an opinion granting summary judgment dismissal in another of the EEOC’s enforcement lawsuits, EEOC v. Freeman (No. 1:10-cv-2882, Maryland).  The scathing opinion by U. S. District Court Judge Roger Titus held that the EEOC’s evidence was unreliable and failed to raise a question of fact or show Freeman’s background check policies created a disparate impact in violation of Title VII.

Continue Reading Maryland Federal District Court’s Dismissal of EEOC v. Freeman Provides Guidance for Employers on Background Check Rules

Last year, we posted about a decision from the Southern District of Texas in which the court ruled that firing a woman because she was lactating or breast-pumping did not amount to sex discrimination under Title VII or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed the district court’s decision. 

Most people understand that employment in Oregon, as in most states, is at will, meaning that either the employer or the employee can end the relationship at any time for any reason or no reason at all, absent a contractual, statutory, or constitutional requirement to the contrary.  Of course, that last clause provides that there are limits on at-will employment.  An employer can’t end the relationship because the employee becomes disabled, needs to fulfill duty obligations in the armed forces reserves, files a complaint against the employer, or a myriad of other unlawful reasons.  Some plaintiff’s lawyers would argue that the at-will employment doctrine is so riddled with exceptions that it doesn’t really exist.  And good employer defense attorneys will advise their clients that, while the doctrine still exists, every termination should be supported by clear, legitimate business reasons – and ideally with good documentation.  But it is clear that no employee can have a reasonable expectation of continued employment, since he or she could be fired at any time.  But what about an applicant?

Suppose an applicant meets with a hiring manager and, after the interview, the manager shakes the applicant’s hand and says “You’re hired!  Come in tomorrow to sign the paperwork.”  The applicant has another offer and the hiring manager encourages him to turn it down.  The applicant does so and, the next day, shows up at his new employer’s offices.  There he is told that they have changed their minds and don’t need him after all.  The applicant is devastated because not only does he not have this job, but the other offer he turned down has already been filled.  The employer, on the other hand, reasons that it could have fired the applicant anyway on his first day on the job under the at-will doctrine, so where is the harm?  The employer argues that if the applicant has a claim, how long does an employer have to employ new hires?   

Continue Reading Oregon Supreme Court Takes Another Big Bite Out of the At-Will Employment Doctrine in Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors

Utah State Senator Steve Urquhart (R-St. George) is sponsoring a bill that would amend Utah’s employment and housing antidiscrimination statutes to address discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. Urquhart introduced Senate Bill 262 to the Utah Senate Rules Committee on March 1, 2013. Currently, several municipalities in Utah have ordinances prohibiting employment or housing discrimination against LGBT individuals, but there is no state-wide protection against such discrimination, nor is the state’s Labor Commission empowered to investigate or remedy any such discrimination.

S.B. 262 would amend the Utah Antidiscrimination Act to make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against or harass an otherwise qualified person because of that person’s sexual orientation or gender identity. The bill defines “sexual orientation” as “an individual’s actual or perceived orientation as heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual.” The bill defines “gender identity” as “an individual’s internal sense of gender, without regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth.” Utah’s Antidiscrimination Act applies to employers employing 15 or more employees but does not apply to religious organizations or associations. S.B. 262 would also exempt organizations “engaged in public or private expression if employing an individual would affect in a significant way the organization’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints protected” by the First Amendment from the definition of “employer.” Thus, certain advocacy groups would not be required to employ LGBT individuals under S.B. 262 if doing so was inconsistent with their mission and would significantly affect their ability to advocate their viewpoints.

Continue Reading Proposed Utah Bill To Prohibit Discrimination Based On Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity

 Employers got some relief from a situation that is becoming more and more common: an employee that claims a scent allergy and wants a work accommodation. In Core v. Champaign County Board of County Commissioners, Case No. 3:11-cv-166 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2012), plaintiff claimed she was allergic to a particular scent that substantially limited her breathing and requested, as an accommodation, that her employer institute a policy requesting that all employees refrain from wearing scented products of any kind. The U.S. Court for the Southern District of Ohio threw the case out, concluding that (1) plaintiff was not disabled, as that term was used under the pre-2009 amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act; and (2) even if the broader post-2009 definition of “disability” were used, plaintiff’s requested accommodation was not reasonable. 

Plaintiff worked for the Champaign County Department of Jobs and Family Services as a social service worker. Her job required her to conduct onsite inspections of childcare facilities, interact with the public and clients both onsite and offsite, and perform in-house client interviews, among other things. She claimed a disability because one particular scent she encountered occasionally in the workplace—Japanese Cherry Blossom—triggered asthma attacks, which substantially limited the major life activity of breathing. (She claimed reactions to other scents, too, but those reactions only included headaches and nausea, which the court found had no impact on plaintiff’s breathing or on any other major life activity.)

Continue Reading Allergy to Perfume Not a Disability, Says Ohio Federal Court

On Halloween, the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) General Counsel’s Division of Advice handed out a rare treat to employers by issuing two Advice Memos (Mimi’s Café, Case No. 28-CA-0844365 and Rocha Transportation, Case No. 32-CA-086799), deeming two particular (and common forms of) at-will employment policies contained in employee handbooks lawful under the National Labor Relations Act (the “Act").  

Earlier this year, an Administrative Law Judge frightened many employers by ruling a particular company’s “at-will” policy violated the Act because it theoretically could make employees believe that they could not form a union or otherwise advocate to change their at-will employment status. That challenged policy stated, “I further agree that the at-will employment relationship cannot be amended, modified or altered in any way.” The case, American Red Cross Arizona Blood Services Division, Case No. 28-CA-23443 (February 1, 2012), was settled before the NLRB could review it on appeal. 

The Division of Advice’s Halloween memoranda distinguished American Red Cross case from Mimi’s Café and Rocha Transportation – noting that the at-will policy in American Red Cross used the personal pronoun “I” (“I further agree that the at-will employment relationship cannot be amended, modified or altered in any way”), which as written essentially constituted an impermissible waiver of any right of employees to try and change at-will status (i.e., to try to form a union).  The Division of Advice also noted that the policy in American Red Cross declared that the at-will employment relationship could never be modified under any circumstances whatsoever, which could be interpreted as chilling employees’ rights under the Act to engage in protected concerted activity such as forming a union.   Finally, the Division of Advice, perhaps dismissively, noted that American Red Cross had settled before getting to the Board level.

Continue Reading Where There Is At-Will, There Is A Way: NLRB Issues New Guidance On “At Will” Employment Policies

From the Presidential debates to lawn signs, and TV ads to the Voters’ Pamphlet in your mailbox, there’s no denying that election season is in full swing. For employers, the home stretch to November 6 means not only around-the-clock coverage, but the potential for spirited debates—and resulting employee discord—in the workplace. Although with limited exception political activity or affiliation is not a protected status, and Oregon employers no longer have to worry about giving employees time off to vote due to mail-in ballots, the impending election still has significant potential to invoke myriad workplace issues ranging from discrimination and harassment to free speech and bullying. Here are some “dos and don’ts” to help guide employers over the next several weeks and keep polarizing political discourse from disrupting your workplace:

* Do set the tone. If you haven’t already, employers should clearly communicate their expectations to employees and foster a culture of mutual respect and understanding. Diversity—even with respect to politics—can be embraced as a positive. Employers lead the way by conveying their acceptance of varying ideologies, and encouraging employees to handle differences of opinion civilly and without letting it affect normal operations. Political conversations between employees often lead to discussion of sensitive (and protected) issues such as race, religion, immigration, and women’s rights. However, election season should not provide a license for employees to harass or bully one another by attacking contrasting political views, bragging about which ballot measures did or did not pass, or gloating over a candidate’s defeat. Employers can minimize risk by reminding employees that their policies prohibiting harassment, discrimination and retaliation apply to all political discussions, and investigating any complaints promptly. Moreover, some employers have in fact included political activity in their EEO or anti-harassment policies, so it may be prudent to dust off and review your handbook, because employees certainly will know what you have promised. Similarly, given that unions are frequently politically active, some union contracts prohibit politics-based discrimination.  

* Don’t allow bad behavior in the name of “free speech.” Contrary to popular belief, there is no blanket right of “free speech” in a private workplace. The First Amendment covers only state action, and private sector employers are therefore free to limit political discussions in the workplace. Be careful, however, that any such limitations don’t run afoul of laws such as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (see next "do," below) or federal and state anti-discrimination laws.

Read on for more election "dos and don’ts" below!


Continue Reading As the Election Nears, Employers Should be Cautious of Politics in the Workplace

Employers have until the end of the year to take advantage of relief from penalties under section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code for agreements that require employees to sign releases before severance benefits are paid. Section 409A was enacted in 2004 to regulate deferred compensation.  Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") regulations made clear that it

In the recent case Hatkoff v. Portland Adventist Medical Center, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed enforcement of a company arbitration provision in an employee handbook requiring that a former employee bring his employment discrimination claims in binding arbitration. The Court’s opinion offers a straight-forward application of the law regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements