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In this week’s mid-term election on November 4, Oregon, Alaska, and the District of Columbia became the latest jurisdictions to pass referendums decriminalizing the recreational possession and use of small amounts of marijuana.  They join Colorado and Washington, which took this step in 2012.  Oregon’s law becomes effective in July 2015; Alaska’s probably in February 2015.

Each of these laws is slightly different (read the full text here of the measures in Oregon, Alaska, and D.C.).  But employers in all these jursidcitions may be wondering about the same question:  does this affect my company’s anti-drug policy or drug testing program and if so, how?Continue Reading What Does Alaska’s and Oregon’s Legalization of Marijuana Change for Employers? Answer: Probably Not Much.

Last week, the 9th Circuit held in two related cases from California and Oregon that FedEx misclassified approximately 2,600 delivery truck drivers as independent contractors, rather than as employees. The cases—Alexander v. FedEx and Slayman v. FedEx—are an important reminder for employers that reality matters more than labels when it comes to classifying workers. 

On that note, the most succinct (and most memorable) summary of the rulings appears in Judge Trott’s short concurrence in Alexander:

“Abraham Lincoln reportedly asked, ‘If you call a dog’s tail a leg, how many legs does a dog have?’ His answer was, ‘Four. Calling a dog’s tail a leg does not make it a leg.’ . . . Labeling the drivers ‘independent contractors’ in FedEx’s Operating Agreement does not conclusively make them so . . . .”

The two cases dealt with virtually identical facts. FedEx’s Operating Agreement (“OA”), which principally governed its business relationships with the 2,300 California drivers and 363 Oregon drivers in each class, contained several generalized clauses that suggested the drivers were independent contractors. For example, the OAs provided that “the manner and means of reaching [the parties’ “mutual business objectives”] are within the discretion of the [driver], and no officer or employee of FedEx . . . shall have the authority to impose any term or condition on the driver . . . which is contrary to this understanding.” The two opinions noted, however, that neither California nor Oregon law views a contract’s description of a worker as an independent contractor as dispositive of the worker’s true status.Continue Reading 9th Cir. Finds FedEx Delivery Drivers Are Employees, Not Contractors

Cantankerous employees beware! Being a jerk is not a disability and, at least according to the Ninth Circuit in Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, blaming bad behavior on a physical or mental impairment does not guarantee protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").

Matthew Weaving was diagnosed with ADHD as a child, but stopped exhibiting symptoms at the age of 12 and was taken off of his ADHD medication. His interpersonal problems continued through adolescence and into adulthood. Weaving pursued a career as a police officer and eventually joined the Hillsboro (Oregon) Police Department in 2006. His relationship with subordinates and peers was strained. Co-workers complained that he often was demeaning and derogatory. Following a subordinate’s complaint about Weaving in 2009, the Police Department placed him on leave pending investigation.

While on leave, Weaving decided that some of his interpersonal difficulties might have been due to ADHD so he sought a mental health evaluation. The psychologist concluded that Weaving had adult ADHD and sent a letter to the police department explaining his diagnosis. The next day, Weaving sent a letter informing his employer about the diagnosis and requesting “all reasonable accommodations.”

A few weeks later, the police department concluded its investigation, finding that Weaving had created and fostered a “hostile work environment for his subordinates and peers,” noting that they described him as “tyrannical, unapproachable, non-communicative, belittling, demeaning, threatening, intimidating, arrogant and vindictive.” Following a fitness for duty examination in which two doctors found Weaving fit for duty despite his ADHD diagnosis, the police department terminated Weaving’s employment.Continue Reading “Isn’t there supposed to be a good cop?” — 9th Circuit Holds Bilious Conduct Not a Disability Under ADA

Under the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2014), many employees now have greater flexibility to extend family and medical leave beyond the typical 12-week limit under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). While the Escriba court’s holding was intended to benefit the employer in that case, Foster Farms, its impact on other employers may have the opposite effect.

Maria Escriba sought two weeks of leave from her employment with Foster Farms in order to care for her ailing father in Guatemala. Although Ms. Escriba informed her supervisors of the FMLA-qualifying reason for the leave, she expressly requested that the time be deemed as vacation leave, rather than family leave. When Ms. Escriba failed to return to work after the expiration of her vacation leave, Foster Farms terminated her employment. 

Ms. Escriba filed suit, alleging that Foster Farms violated the FMLA and the substantively identical California Family Rights Act by terminating her employment. Specifically, she claimed that Foster Farms was required to designate her leave as FMLA leave, regardless of whether she declined FMLA leave, arguing that an employee cannot waive her rights under the FMLA.Continue Reading Ninth Circuit Approves Employees’ Right to Strategically Decline FMLA Leave In Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms

The Sixth Circuit recently held in EEOC v. Ford Motor Co. that regular attendance may not mean physical presence in the workplace, and that telecommuting may be a reasonable accommodation for some employees with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").  This case provides yet another cautionary tale for employers wrestling with complex ADA accommodation issues.

Irritable Bowel Syndrome Makes It Hard To Be At Work–Can Telecommuting Be The Answer?

Jane Harris had worked at Ford since 2003 as a resale buyer, acting as an intermediary to ensure there was no gap in steel supply to parts manufacturers. Although the job duties included such tasks as updating spreadsheets and making site visits, the main function of the job was group problem-solving, which required communication and collaboration with the resale team and others in the supply chain. Harris’ managers determined that such interactions were best handled face-to-face.

Harris suffered from irritable bowel syndrome, which caused fecal incontinence, and began taking intermittent FMLA leave when her symptoms flared up. Her job performance suffered after she began to take leave. Harris was unable to establish consistent working hours, and frequently made mistakes because she could not access suppliers while working nights and weekends. Her co-workers and manager were forced to pick up some of the slack. Eventually, in February 2009, she formally requested that she be permitted to telecommute on an as-needed basis to accommodate her disability. Although Ford had a policy permitting telecommuting up to four days a week, the policy also stated that such an arrangement was not appropriate for all positions or managers. However, some of Harris’ counterparts telecommuted one day a week.Continue Reading Court Rules That Telecommuting May Be a Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA

After more than 20 years under the ADA and FMLA, and 18 years since the passage of the Oregon Family Leave Act (“OFLA”), most employers are familiar with the basics of these laws. Many employee leave situations can be handled in a basic and straightforward manner. Unfortunately, others involve an obscure application of a particular law, or the thorny challenges presented by the interplay of all three laws. (Unlike FMLA and OFLA, the ADA was not specifically enacted for the purpose of providing leave per se. In fact, EEOC Commissioner Chai Feldblum has referred to the ADA as “an inadvertent leave law.”) 

This post gives an overview of specific practical tips to address some of the stickier leave situations that can arise.  (Shameless self-promotional plug:  these and other topics were covered in depth at a Stoel Rives Breakfast Briefing Seminar.  For details on other Stoel Rives seminars and breakfast briefings, click here.)Continue Reading FMLA Leave or ADA Accommodation (Or Both)? Overview of Beyond the Basics

As almost everyone knows, the U.S. Supreme Court  issued two blockbuster decisions on gay marriage, U.S. v. Windsor, which struck down the Defense of Marriage Act’s ("DOMA") definition of marriage for the purposes of federal law, and Hollingsworth v. Perry, which struck down California’s "Proposition 8" prohibiting same-sex marriage in that state.  Those decisions will likely have significant effects on employers, such as with respect to employee benefits, health care and tax issues related to employees with same-sex partners.  For example,read here for a detailed discussion of how the Supreme Court’s decisions may impact employee benefits.

Those decisions, particularly Windsor, also will have an immediate impact on employee coverage under the federal Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), which requires covered employers to provide up to 12 weeks per year of unpaid leave to eligible employees for qualifying reasons (more leave may be required in certain situations, such as leave related to military duty).  One such qualifying reason entitles an employee to take leave to care for a family member, such as a family member with a serious health condition.  FMLA specifically defines family members to include a "spouse," which is further defined to mean a "husband or wife as defined or recognized under State law for purposes of marriage in the State where the employee resides, including common law marriage in States where it is recognized."  29 CFR 825.122.  Despite the fact that states have begun recognizing same-sex marriage in recent years, because the DOMA specifically defined marriage as only between a man and woman for the purposes of federal law, the DOMA basically overrode those states’ laws for the purposes of FMLA coverage to spouses.Continue Reading U.S. Supreme Court’s Decisions on DOMA Extend FMLA Definition of “Spouse” To Same-Sex Partners In States Recognizing Gay Marriage

On Monday, we blogged about the first of two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.  Today, we’ll discuss the second decision, Vance v. Ball State University, which addressed who is a “supervisor” for vicarious liability purposes under Title VII.  The decision provides clarity in a previously muddled area of law, and has important implications for employer liability for workplace harassment under Title VII.

As you probably know, Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and similarly prohibits harassment resulting in a hostile work environment based on these characteristics.  The plaintiff in Vance was a catering assistant who filed a lawsuit claiming that she had been subjected to a racially hostile work environment at the hands of a catering specialist in her department.  Although the parties disagreed about whether the specialist was a supervisor, they did agree that she lacked authority to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer or discipline the plaintiff.  The district (trial) court found that without this authority, the specialist was not a supervisor for whose actions the employer could be vicariously liable under Title VII.Continue Reading Part 2 of 2: Supreme Court Rules That “Supervisors” Under Title VII Must Have Power to Take Tangible Employment Actions

On one day recently, the U.S. Supreme Court issued employer-friendly opinions in two separate and long-awaited cases interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (known simply as “Title VII”), the primary federal employment discrimination statute.  While both cases change little about what employers should be doing day-to-day to prevent unlawful discrimination in the workplace, both may have profound effects on the ability of employers to successfully defend against Title VII claims.  In fact, this was such a big day at the Supreme Court for labor and employment law that we’re going to blog about it twice!  Today, we blog about one of those cases, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, in which the Court increased the burden of plaintiff’s asserting retaliation claims under Title VII by requiring that they show their protected conduct was the “but for” cause of the adverse employment action.  

Later in the week, we’ll blog about the other case, Vance v. Ball State University, in which the Court narrowed the definition of “supervisor” to only those with actual authority to hire and fire employees, limiting the situations where employers can be liable for the discriminatory acts of lower-level employees. 

Nassar Requires “But For” Causation In Title VII Retaliation Cases Based On That Statute’s Structure

Title VII, as any reader of this blog probably knows, is the granddaddy of all federal anti-discrimination statutes. First enacted in 1964, its primary provision, 42 USC § 2000e-2, prohibits employers from taking employment action against employees “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to, among other things, lessen the burden of proof on causation; plaintiffs bringing discrimination claims under Title VII need only show that a discriminatory motive was “a motivating factor…even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 USC § 2000e-2(m).  In other words, plaintiffs need not show that a discriminatory animus on the part of a manager was the only or even primary motive behind the employment action—if the employee’s race, gender, etc. was considered at all, the company could be liable for discrimination.  (Section 2(m) did create affirmative defenses that allow the employer to avoid money damages in these so called “mixed motive” cases if it can show that it would have taken the adverse action anyway regardless of the discriminatory motivation).

Continue Reading Part 1 of 2: The U.S. Supreme Court Issues Two Employer-Friendly Opinions On Title VII In Vance v. Ball State Univ. and Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar

Last year, we posted about a decision from the Southern District of Texas in which the court ruled that firing a woman because she was lactating or breast-pumping did not amount to sex discrimination under Title VII or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed the district court’s decision. …