Title VII

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The U.S. Supreme Court handed a defeat to United Parcel Service (UPS) this week. At issue was whether UPS violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) by requiring a pregnant woman with lifting restrictions to go on leave during her pregnancy, while workers in certain other categories (such as those with on-the-job injuries) were allowed light duty. We consider the ruling and the lessons it holds for employer leave and accommodation policies below.

In a decision announced March 25, 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that the district court, which had dismissed Young v. UPS (PDF) on summary judgment, must proceed to trial on the question of whether intentional discrimination occurred when a pregnant UPS employee was treated less favorably than others in similar situations.

The Court ruled in Young that under the PDA an employee can make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that she was denied accommodation, while other sick or disabled workers with a similar inability to work were allowed accommodation. The employer then must show that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the difference in treatment to avoid liability, and if it makes such a showing the plaintiff can rebut the showing through evidence of pretext.
Continue Reading Supreme Court Sends UPS Pregnancy Accommodation Case to Trial

pharmacistEmployers like separation agreements.  Separation agreements, of course, are contracts that employees sign when their employment is terminated that allows them to be paid severance and in exchange they usually give up the right to sue their employer.  Separation agreements provide finality to employment terminations by offering employers protection from claims and potential claims.  The agreements many employers use are often standardized and have served them well for years.  But now might be the time to take another look at those documents, lest the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) looks first.

Recently, the EEOC has aggressively asserted its (re)interpretation of the law regarding the enforceability of separation (severance) agreements, suing several companies for using what it perceived to be overly broad agreements.  See, EEOC v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. no. 1:14-cv-00863 (N.D. Ill. 2014); see also, EEOC v. CollegeAmerica Denver, Inc., no. 14-cv-01232-LTB (E.D. Co. 2014).  The EEOC doesn’t like separation agreements that do not make it sufficiently clear (in the EEOC’s opinion) that employees do not waive the right to file charges with the EEOC or participate in agency investigations, even though the employee can waive claims for damages under the statutes the EEOC enforces like Title VII or the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  In the CVS Pharmacy and CollegeAmerica cases, the EEOC alleged the employers’ separation agreement forms constituted a “pattern or practice” of denying employees their statutory rights.  (“Pattern or practice” is significant because such cases can carry much higher penalties than a run-of-the-mill lawsuit; they can also inspire class-action lawyers to start snooping around.)Continue Reading EEOC’s Tough Stance on Employee Separation Agreements

On Monday, we blogged about the first of two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.  Today, we’ll discuss the second decision, Vance v. Ball State University, which addressed who is a “supervisor” for vicarious liability purposes under Title VII.  The decision provides clarity in a previously muddled area of law, and has important implications for employer liability for workplace harassment under Title VII.

As you probably know, Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and similarly prohibits harassment resulting in a hostile work environment based on these characteristics.  The plaintiff in Vance was a catering assistant who filed a lawsuit claiming that she had been subjected to a racially hostile work environment at the hands of a catering specialist in her department.  Although the parties disagreed about whether the specialist was a supervisor, they did agree that she lacked authority to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer or discipline the plaintiff.  The district (trial) court found that without this authority, the specialist was not a supervisor for whose actions the employer could be vicariously liable under Title VII.Continue Reading Part 2 of 2: Supreme Court Rules That “Supervisors” Under Title VII Must Have Power to Take Tangible Employment Actions

On one day recently, the U.S. Supreme Court issued employer-friendly opinions in two separate and long-awaited cases interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (known simply as “Title VII”), the primary federal employment discrimination statute.  While both cases change little about what employers should be doing day-to-day to prevent unlawful discrimination in the workplace, both may have profound effects on the ability of employers to successfully defend against Title VII claims.  In fact, this was such a big day at the Supreme Court for labor and employment law that we’re going to blog about it twice!  Today, we blog about one of those cases, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, in which the Court increased the burden of plaintiff’s asserting retaliation claims under Title VII by requiring that they show their protected conduct was the “but for” cause of the adverse employment action.  

Later in the week, we’ll blog about the other case, Vance v. Ball State University, in which the Court narrowed the definition of “supervisor” to only those with actual authority to hire and fire employees, limiting the situations where employers can be liable for the discriminatory acts of lower-level employees. 

Nassar Requires “But For” Causation In Title VII Retaliation Cases Based On That Statute’s Structure

Title VII, as any reader of this blog probably knows, is the granddaddy of all federal anti-discrimination statutes. First enacted in 1964, its primary provision, 42 USC § 2000e-2, prohibits employers from taking employment action against employees “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to, among other things, lessen the burden of proof on causation; plaintiffs bringing discrimination claims under Title VII need only show that a discriminatory motive was “a motivating factor…even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 USC § 2000e-2(m).  In other words, plaintiffs need not show that a discriminatory animus on the part of a manager was the only or even primary motive behind the employment action—if the employee’s race, gender, etc. was considered at all, the company could be liable for discrimination.  (Section 2(m) did create affirmative defenses that allow the employer to avoid money damages in these so called “mixed motive” cases if it can show that it would have taken the adverse action anyway regardless of the discriminatory motivation).

Continue Reading Part 1 of 2: The U.S. Supreme Court Issues Two Employer-Friendly Opinions On Title VII In Vance v. Ball State Univ. and Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar

Last year, we posted about a decision from the Southern District of Texas in which the court ruled that firing a woman because she was lactating or breast-pumping did not amount to sex discrimination under Title VII or the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed the district court’s decision. …

On Friday, April 20, 2012, the EEOC issued a landmark ruling that intentional discrimination against a transgender individual is discrimination “based on … sex” and thus violates Title VII. Prior to this ruling, the EEOC generally declined to pursue discrimination claims that arose from transgender status or gender identity issues.

What does this mean for…

For many new moms returning to work after the birth of a child, pumping breast-milk is considered to be a necessary evil.  Necessary because pumping ensures that these mothers’ babies can continue to experience the many benefits of breast-milk, and helps the mothers to maintain their milk supplies, relieves painful engorgement, and prevents potentially serious …

On June 29, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court unanimously upheld a district court ruling that a state worker could not maintain an action against her employer for wrongful discharge based on allegations that her supervisor’s intra-office romance and consequent favoritism toward his paramour created a hostile work environment. See Patterson v. State of Idaho Dep’t …

Retaliation claims are increasing at an alarming pace. Not only have these claims tripled in number within the last two decades, they now exceed race discrimination as the leading claim filed with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  Click here to see EEOC statistics.

Why the startling trend? First, Congress has gone to great lengths to protect…