Once again, federal courts have halted efforts by the current National Labor Relations Board ("the Board") to expand its regulatory reach. Earlier this week, in National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit struck down the Board’s controversial attempt to require virtually all employers to post a notice advising employees about the requirements of the National Labor Relations Act ("the Act") and the sixty years of interpretations of the federal labor laws.

The Board’s notice-posting rule has had a long and contentious history.  The original petition was filed in 1993, but it was not until 2010 when the Board, by then with a majority of members appointed by President Obama, issued a proposed rule.  The final rule was published in August, 2011, and litigation challenging the Board’s authority began almost immediately.  As we have reported before, the Board had only mixed success.  One district court upheld the rule only in part, and another struck down the rule completely.  While those cases were on appeal, the posting requirement was stayed pending completion of judicial review.Continue Reading D.C. Circuit Nixes Board Notice Posting Rule In National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB

A single Ninth Circuit judge, in his capacity as chair of the Circuit’s Standing Committee on Federal Public Defenders (“the Standing Committee”), recently ruled in the unpublished decision of In the Matter of Alison Clark that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) and Oregon’s Measure 36 violate the United States and Oregon Constitutions by unlawfully discriminating against same-sex couples.

Alison Clark, a federal public defender in Oregon, married Anna Campbell in Canada in 2012. Clark’s marriage was not recognized in Oregon, due to Measure 36, a ballot initiative passed in 2004 that defined marriage as between only a man and a woman. In addition, the federal government did not recognize Clark’s marriage, as DOMA similarly defines marriage as a legal union between one man and one woman.Continue Reading Ninth Circuit’s Standing Committee on Federal Public Defenders Finds DOMA and Oregon’s Measure 36 to be Unconstitutional

Today the US Supreme Court issued its long-awaited opinion in Genesis Healthcare v. Symczk. In the case, the Court held that employers could effectively end collective action lawsuits under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by agreeing to pay the named plaintiffs in those lawsuits whatever they claim they are owed. The Court held that because the named plaintiff was made completely whole by the employer’s offer her individual claim was moot, and because the named plaintiff’s claim was moot the entire collective action litigation was dismissed. This decision provides a helpful tactical weapon for employers that face the prospect of long and expensive collective action litigation.

How To “Pick Off” A Big FLSA Collective Action Lawsuit
Laura Symczk was employed as a nurse for Genesis, and was non-exempt under wage laws like the FLSA. She filed an FLSA “collective action” against Genesis claiming that it unlawfully failed to pay her and other nurses for meal breaks in which she had to work (the FLSA requires that employers pay employees for all their work time, including during meal breaks when the employee is not relieved of all work duties). Very early in the litigation, Genesis Healthcare issued what is called an “offer of judgment” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 68, offering to pay Symczk everything she claimed she was owed for her own unpaid work time (about $7,500, plus her attorney fees to date). The trial court then dismissed her entire collective action lawsuit, finding that because Symczk was made completely whole by Genesis’ offer and no others had yet joined the collective action, the case was “moot.”Continue Reading US Supreme Court Gives Green Light For Employers To Use Offers Of Judgment To Moot FLSA Collective Actions

As a friendly reminder, employers must update two key employment forms this month.  As of March 8th, employers must begin using the most recent FMLA poster issued by the Department of Labor.  The updated poster reflects the DOL’s final rule concerning military related leave available under FMLA.  The DOL has also issued new FMLA forms to…

We previously advised you that the Portland City Council was considering an ordinance that would require Portland employers to provide sick leave to employees. The Council voted unanimously to approve the ordinance on Wednesday, meaning that Portland will now join a handful of jurisdictions (including Connecticut, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.) that require employers to give employees time off for illness. Similar bills have also been introduced in the state legislature, although it is too soon to predict whether they will pass.

The Portland ordinance, which takes effect on January 1, 2014, generally requires private employers to provide 40 hours of sick leave per year to eligible employees. For employers with six or more employees, the time must be paid; for smaller businesses, leave may be unpaid. Employers that already provide sick leave equivalent to or in excess of what the ordinance requires do not need to make any changes.Continue Reading Portland City Council Approves Sick Leave Ordinance

Most people understand that employment in Oregon, as in most states, is at will, meaning that either the employer or the employee can end the relationship at any time for any reason or no reason at all, absent a contractual, statutory, or constitutional requirement to the contrary.  Of course, that last clause provides that there are limits on at-will employment.  An employer can’t end the relationship because the employee becomes disabled, needs to fulfill duty obligations in the armed forces reserves, files a complaint against the employer, or a myriad of other unlawful reasons.  Some plaintiff’s lawyers would argue that the at-will employment doctrine is so riddled with exceptions that it doesn’t really exist.  And good employer defense attorneys will advise their clients that, while the doctrine still exists, every termination should be supported by clear, legitimate business reasons – and ideally with good documentation.  But it is clear that no employee can have a reasonable expectation of continued employment, since he or she could be fired at any time.  But what about an applicant?

Suppose an applicant meets with a hiring manager and, after the interview, the manager shakes the applicant’s hand and says “You’re hired!  Come in tomorrow to sign the paperwork.”  The applicant has another offer and the hiring manager encourages him to turn it down.  The applicant does so and, the next day, shows up at his new employer’s offices.  There he is told that they have changed their minds and don’t need him after all.  The applicant is devastated because not only does he not have this job, but the other offer he turned down has already been filled.  The employer, on the other hand, reasons that it could have fired the applicant anyway on his first day on the job under the at-will doctrine, so where is the harm?  The employer argues that if the applicant has a claim, how long does an employer have to employ new hires?   Continue Reading Oregon Supreme Court Takes Another Big Bite Out of the At-Will Employment Doctrine in Cocchiara v. Lithia Motors

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issued an interim final rule and request for comments regarding procedures for handling employee whistleblower complaints under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), Section 1558. This part of the ACA added a new Section 18c to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which protects employees from retaliation for exercising certain rights under the ACA, including (1) receiving a federal tax credit or subsidy to purchase insurance through the employer or a future health insurance exchange, (2) reporting a violation of consumer protection rules under the ACA (which, for instance, prohibit denial of health coverage based on preexisting conditions and lifetime limits on coverage), and (3) assisting or participating in a proceeding under Section 1558.

The interim final rule states the time frames and procedures for bringing a whistleblower complaint under Section 18c and covers the investigation, hearing, and appeals processes. An employee has 180 days from the date of the alleged retaliation to bring a whistleblower complaint to the Secretary of Labor. Where a violation is found, remedies can include reinstatement, compensatory damages, back pay, and reasonable costs and expenses (including attorneys’ fees). If the employee brought the complaint in bad faith, an employer may recover up to $1,000 in reasonable attorneys’ fees.Continue Reading OSHA Issues Interim Final Rules on Whistleblower Protection Provisions Under ACA

Utah State Senator Steve Urquhart (R-St. George) is sponsoring a bill that would amend Utah’s employment and housing antidiscrimination statutes to address discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. Urquhart introduced Senate Bill 262 to the Utah Senate Rules Committee on March 1, 2013. Currently, several municipalities in Utah have ordinances prohibiting employment or housing discrimination against LGBT individuals, but there is no state-wide protection against such discrimination, nor is the state’s Labor Commission empowered to investigate or remedy any such discrimination.

S.B. 262 would amend the Utah Antidiscrimination Act to make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against or harass an otherwise qualified person because of that person’s sexual orientation or gender identity. The bill defines “sexual orientation” as “an individual’s actual or perceived orientation as heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual.” The bill defines “gender identity” as “an individual’s internal sense of gender, without regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth.” Utah’s Antidiscrimination Act applies to employers employing 15 or more employees but does not apply to religious organizations or associations. S.B. 262 would also exempt organizations “engaged in public or private expression if employing an individual would affect in a significant way the organization’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints protected” by the First Amendment from the definition of “employer.” Thus, certain advocacy groups would not be required to employ LGBT individuals under S.B. 262 if doing so was inconsistent with their mission and would significantly affect their ability to advocate their viewpoints.Continue Reading Proposed Utah Bill To Prohibit Discrimination Based On Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity